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4Is there a Future for Regional Banks and Regional Exchanges?
The Strategies of Selected Austrian Finance Institutions
Editorial
It has been argued that the combination of technological advance, the
European Single Market, the advent of EMU and, more generally, the reality
of a global financial community, is undermining the competitive position of
small, regional financial organisations, be they banks, stock exchanges or
other financial entities. This line of argument leads to the conclusion that
there is no viable business future for the small.
This  SUERF Study offers points of view to the contrary, both from the
academic and “practitioners” angle. Professor David Llewellyn contributes
the academic view, strongly arguing that size per se is not the issue but rather
that efficient, well focused small and medium-sized financial institutions
remain viable. Representatives of three regional financial institutions in
Austria were asked to discuss elements of their business strategy to
substantiate their belief in the viability of their institution’s future. The
contribution by Reinhard Ortner (Erste Bank) is based on a talk he gave on
the occasion of the 22
nd SUERF Colloquium in Vienna in 2000, and that of
Helmut Stepic (Raiffeisen Zentralbank) on a speech at the Alpbacher Banking
Seminar in 2001. The consolidation and concentration process has, of course,
also engulfed stock exchanges and many of the small ones have already been
pronounced terminally ill. Stefan Zapotocky (Wiener Börse AG) is firm in his
view that regional exchanges will have a viable future catering for regional
financing needs. His contribution is based on a presentation at the SUERF
Salzburg Seminar of 2002, which dealt with the future of regional exchanges.
Eduard Hochreiter
SUERF Secretary General
5THE FUTURE FOR SMALL & REGIONAL BANKS
IN EUROPE
David T. Llewellyn
Professor of Money & Banking
Loughborough University, Loughborough, Leicestershire, LE11 3TU, UK
Tel: (44) (0)1509 222700
Fax: (44) (0)1509 223910
email: D.T.Llewellyn@lboro.ac.uk
7Introduction & Context
A distinguishing feature of banking in many European countries is that there
is a large number of comparatively small, and often locally or regionally
based banks. In some markets such banks compete with very large, global
financial conglomerates. A central strategic question is addressed in this
paper: is there a viable business future for the comparatively small and
regionally-based financial services institution? A key issue is whether, in
a world where a major consolidation process is unfolding in the financial
sector, there is a future for comparatively small (perhaps regional or even
local) financial institutions.
Our conclusion is that size per se is not the key issue and that, providing it is
efficient, there is a clear and viable future for the comparatively small,
regional and focused financial firm.
The following two studies describe the chosen strategy of two successful
regionally-based Austrian banks and how they have sought to exploit their
competitive advantages in new markets. Before that, this chapter offers
a more general overview of the future of regionally-based banks which
compete with national and global banks and in a world where economies of
scale seem to be increasing. The fourth and final study addresses the future
prospects of the small regional stock exchange.
1. The strategy matrix
Two dominant trends in bank strategy (size and diversification) can be
represented in a strategy matrix as described in figure 1. The general trend is
for financial firms to seek to move from left to right along the horizontal axis
of the matrix (i.e. to become larger), and from top to bottom (i.e. to become
more diversified). In other words, the global trend is towards the bottom right
hand segment of the matrix.
9While this has become something of a conventional wisdom, the strategy does
not go without challenge in either dimension: scale and diversification. It is
not self-evident that economies of scale are dominant in banks to the extent
that only very large banks can be competitive, or that being widely diversified
(geographically or product mix) is the only route to success. There is scope
for small, regionally-based and focused financial institutions to compete
alongside large diversified national and global institutions in the pluralistic
financial systems that are likely to emerge. Two examples for strategies of
small regional banks are presented in the two papers (by Stepic and Ortner)
that follow.
1.1 Economies of scale
Three key strategic issues for banks and other financial firms relate to: (1)
whether there are economies of scale in banks, (2) if so, the origin of such
economies, and (3) how any such economies of scale are to be secured
through alternative organisational structures.
An enormous academic empirical literature has attempted to identify and
measure economies and diseconomies of scale in banks. For a review of the
theoretical and empirical literature on scale economies in banking see
Goddard, et al. (2001) and Llewellyn (1999). The traditional empirical
literature does not yield unambiguous results and tends to conclude that there
are only limited economies of scale in banks. Although there are differences
between the studies, almost all suggest there are no significant scale
efficiencies to be gained, and possibly some slight scale efficiency losses to
be suffered, from mergers and acquisitions involving large banks. As put by
Bisignano (1998) in the context of a wave of bank mergers: ‘with reference
to banks a puzzle exists, since there is little empirical analysis which confirms
the existence of significant economies of scale in banking ..... the
merger-acquisition wave in banking is difficult to understand.’
Overall, except with comparatively small banks, there seems to be little
evidence that large banks have lower average costs than smaller banks, and
economies of scale seem to be exhausted at comparatively low levels. There
is some evidence that increasing size beyond a certain point has the effect of
raising unit costs. The overwhelming conclusion from the empirical evidence
is that the major determinant of a bank’s cost level is not size per se but its
own internal efficiency (X-efficiency). In other words, the variation in costs
between banks of similar size is greater than that between banks of different
size. Overall, there is no firm evidence that size per se is a necessary
10 The strategy matrixingredient of success. While many researchers find significant potential
economies of scale, it remains the case that most large banks do not fully
exploit this.
Many research studies of scale efficiencies in the late 1980s and early
1990s were based on US data from the 1980s. More recent literature is
identifying greater economies of scale than in the past. This later research
suggests there may be more substantial scale economies. It would appear that
the potential for scale economies increased in the 1990s compared with
earlier periods. This may in part be associated with the impact of information
and processing technology in two respects: modern technology is large scale,
and expensive in nature and hence is feasible and economic only for large
banks, and processing technology is raising the economies of scale in many
bank processes. The cost of technology is very high and has become a major
aspect of the cost structure of banks. In this regard, some banks cite the cost
of installing new technology as a major motive for a merger.
Economies of scale are increasing in many areas of financial services.
However, they tend to be in processes rather than firms per se. When
considering economies of scale, therefore, a distinction needs to be made
between banks as firms and bank processes. Individual bank processes
(cheque clearing, credit card administration, etc.) do show economies of scale
even though it may be difficult to discern in institutions per se.
This is an important conclusion as, while competitive pressures are forcing
banks to lower their costs, there are other ways of achieving economies of
scale in bank processing than by being a big bank. Acentral strategic issue for
financial firms of all sizes, therefore, is how to secure the competitive
imperatives of economies of scale. Being big is only one way of securing such
economies: other options include establishing joint ventures and shared
facilities, outsourcing processes, insourcing processes, co-operative ventures,
or creating a confederation of financial firms. In effect, small firms which are
unable to secure economies of scale internally are able to secure them
externally, i.e. by buying into economies of scale externally. We return to this
in a later section.
The strategy matrix 112. Consolidation in global banking
Several factors account for the growth in merger and consolidation activity in
global banking over the past few years: the evolution of technology which has
increased the economies of scale in banking (Berger, et al., 1999); the
increasing focus on shareholder value as the ultimate business focus by bank
management’s; the increased focus on risk analysis, management and control
by banks and the fact that new tools of financial engineering and risk
management may be more efficiently produced by larger institutions (Berger,
et. al., 1999), and consolidation being viewed in many countries whose banks
have experienced serious distress in recent years as a solution to excess
capacity problems. Also, the generally increased degree of globalisation of
the banking industry which has encouraged banks to focus on the scale of
their operations, and has induced cross-border mergers and acquisitions on
a larger scale than in the past.
The BIS (1992) notes that ‘competitive forces are obliging many banks to
consolidate ... whether the competition stems from within the industry or
outside it, from other financial intermediaries, open capital markets or even
non-financial companies themselves’. A ‘merger movement’ has become
a pronounced feature of the US banking industry, and there has also been
a marked increase in the number of mergers and acquisitions in banking in
Europe (notably Scandinavia), and other parts of the world. Overall, the likely
trend in many countries is for a reduction in the number of independent
banking units and a concentration into a smaller number of larger units.
It is increasingly becoming the conventional wisdom that, assuming there to
be economies of scale in banking, competitive pressures will force more
consolidation in the global banking industry (more in some countries than
others dependent, in part, upon the starting position).
2.1 Reservations on scale
There are several reasons to be cautious about the conventional argument
about the existence of economies of scale as a rationale for bank mergers:
❍ Limited evidence. An enormous amount of research has attempted to
identify and measure economies and diseconomies of scale in banks. The
results are, at best, inconclusive and ambiguous. Overall, except with
13comparatively small banks, there is little support for the proposition that
large banks have lower average costs than smaller banks. Economies of
scale seem to be exhausted at comparatively low levels. The overwhelming
conclusion is that the major determinant of a bank’s cost level is not size
per se but its own internal efficiency. In other words, the variation in costs
between banks of similar size is greater than that between banks of
different size. However, some recent research using different econometric
techniques, different efficiency concepts, and/or more recent data from the
1990s, suggests that there may be more substantial scale, scope and
product-mix efficiency gains available from consolidation. For instance,
Berger and Mester (1997) found 1990s data displayed substantial cost scale
economies of the order of about 20 percent of costs, for bank sizes up to
about $10-25 billion of assets. It would appear that the potential for scale
economies has increased in the 1990s than in earlier periods. This may be
associated with the development of technology noted in earlier sections.
❍ Banks v Banking. When considering economies of scale, a distinction
needs to be made between banks and bank processes. Individual bank
processes (cheque clearing, credit card administration, etc.) do show
economies of scale. Combining the two conclusions seems to suggest that
there are no clear economies of scale in banks (in that large banks do not
consistently have lower average costs than smaller banks) but they do exist
in banking. 
❍ Dis-economies of scale. Emphasis is usually given in public debate to
economies of scale. However, there can also be dis-economies of scale: i.e.
average costs rise beyond a certain size of firm. There are many possible
reasons for this: inability of management to control a very large
organisation; more bureaucratic procedures; weakening of innovation in
large bureaucracies, etc. There is nothing in the theory of economies of
scale that suggests that the average cost curve continues to fall as size
increases.
❍ Size is not itself a source of sustainable competitive advantage. It is an
illusion to believe that size in itself creates competitive advantage on
a sustainable basis. There are many factors that determine the
competitiveness of any financial firm, but size per se is not one of them.
In a recent study, the management consultancy firm Mitchell Madison noted
that merger activity among European banks has accelerated and yet most
mergers in the banking sector have failed to deliver value to shareholders.
14 Consolidation in global banking2.2 Overall assessment
As in many areas, fashion often plays a role in the evolution of bank
strategies: decisions are often made on the basis of very limited evidence and
simple assumptions about what is likely to be successful. There is a danger of
a conventional wisdom emerging: that only large and highly diversified banks
will survive in the strongly competitive environment that will emerge in the
next few years. This could be an illusion. Success will be determined mainly
by considerations internal to the bank (management efficiency, etc.) rather
than applying any particular model on the size-diversification matrix. To
think otherwise, and to build strategies exclusively on a particular model, is
a delusion, and potentially a dangerous one for it would divert attention away
from what really matters: having a clear and credible strategy, and being good
at doing what the bank chooses to do.
Consolidation in global banking 153. Contract banking
One reason why banks sometimes choose to merge or acquire in order to
become bigger is to secure the economies of scale that exist in many banks
processes. However, this assumes that such economies can only be secured
internally. This is challenged by the trend towards deconstruction in many
banks.
The process of deconstruction involves decomposing services into their
component parts which may then be costed and provided separately. These
components need not be undertaken by the same firm and if, for any reason,
different firms have different comparative advantages in different parts of the
process, the logical development is for each process to be supplied separately
by the firm which has a comparative advantage in doing so. For instance,
firms which have an efficient capability for originating and administering
loans may not necessarily be the most efficient at holding assets on the
balance sheet.
A major pressure in the financial services industry in the years ahead will be
the accentuation of the deconstruction process, with institutions concentrating
on those parts of the business, and those processes, in which they have
a competitive advantage. This will require some firms to adopt a radical
approach to their organisational structure.
A key issue (particularly for small banks) is the extent to which
competitiveness can be maintained within existing organisational structures,
or whether, at some point, further cost management strategies require a major
re-engineering of the organisation and process management.
There are several alternative strategies for securing the benefits of economies
of scale of which being a large firm is only one. Other options include joint
ventures, out-sourcing joint ventures between banks, and the creation of
‘confederations’ whereby services are provided collectively to several banks
within the confederation. An example of the last-mentioned is the Credit
Unions Services Corporation in Australia (see Llewellyn, 1997). In the
financial services industry, many organisations have sought to achieve
economies of scale by out-sourcing processes: in effect, they have bought-in
economies of scale by sub-contracting processes to specialist firms (or to
other banks) which, because they provide the same homogenised service to
17several firms, are able to secure economies of scale through spreading fixed
costs across a wider range of output.
This is likely to become a more pronounced trend with all financial
institutions. The outsourcing firm gains the advantages of economies of scale.
Above all, a major advantage of outsourcing is that it transforms fixed costs
into variable costs and hence reduces the requirement for, often large, up-
front costs in developing and adapting processing facilities. In the same way,
the firm also achieves greater flexibility by not being locked-in to a particular
technology. There are other advantages to outsourcing: it enables firms to
concentrate on their core activities (in which they have a comparative
advantage) without the managerial diversion involved in peripheral and
support operations which can be supplied equally well, and more efficiently,
by outside specialist organisations.
The outsourcing firm also gains more flexibility in the use of technology.
Because of the high start-up costs in some technology projects, once a system
has been established the firm becomes locked-in to the system because sunk
costs are high. This is most especially a problem when technology is
developing at a rapid pace.
Although many out-sourcing arrangements involve technology projects, data
storage and transactions, etc., it can be extended to encompass awide variety of
processes. These could include call centres, marketing, fund management, etc.
In the evolving competitive market place that will increasingly come to
characterise European banking, all financial firms will be under pressure to
secure operational economies as a means of maintaining competitiveness.
Increasingly, this will imply radical new structures of the financial firm. In
particular, the traditional vertically integrated firm will become only one of
a wide spectrum of alternative structures. Technology, and the ability to
deconstruct, therefore has implications for the optimal structure of the
financial services firm.
Thus the banking firm can be viewed as a firm which has an interface with
a customer base (supplying a range of apparently integrated products and
services) while demanding a series of support services in order to supply
those services. Under the Contract Banking model, the bank defines its
products and decides which components are to be supplied internally and
which sub-contracted. In effect, a series of contracts are established by the
contracting bank with internal and external suppliers. Contract banking
18 Contract bankingimplies a bank offering a full range of services but where the bank co-
ordinates inputs from a wide range of different companies. The core is
a contract the bank has with its customers to supply a set of services or
products of a particular standard. In turn, the bank contractor has a set of
contracts with a range of internal and external suppliers of the components of
these ultimate products and services. The value added by the bank contractor
is in the management of these contracts. What appears to customers as an
integrated product or service is in fact a series of deconstructed components
which may or may not be supplied from within the bank.
The central strategic issue is which components are to be supplied internally,
which are to be sub-contracted, and which are to be exported. Core-
competencies of particular banks are relevant in this.
A recent survey conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC, 2001) in the
UK amongst twenty five building societies indicated that most Societies
(84 percent) claimed to be outsourcing some of their operations the most
frequent activities being IT, professional services such as valuations and
internal audit, and basic support and infrastructure such as payroll and
physical security. There are several reasons why out-sourcing is undertaken
and why it has become an increasingly common feature in banking:
❍ to reap economies of scale that cannot be obtained internally;
❍ some areas may be too specialised to be undertaken internally;
❍ a particular expertise may not be available internally and may be
uneconomic to acquire;
❍ to gain increased flexibility in the use of technology;
❍ to spread (most especially fixed) costs and risks;
❍ to break an internal monopoly when services are supplied exclusively
internally;
❍ to change the cost structure: lower fixed costs.
As already noted, a major advantage of out-sourcing is that it transforms fixed
costs into variable costs and hence reduces the requirement for, often large,
up-front costs in developing and adapting processing facilities. Many
processes in banking have high fixed and low variable costs which is a classic
symptom of economies of scale. If a firm conducts its own processing it pays,
and must recoup through the pricing of its products and services, both the
large fixed and small variable costs of the process. On the other hand, if it
sub-contracts the process it pays the supplier a proportion of the
supplier’s fixed costs plus the variable costs. The whole procedure is
Contract banking 19economic if the higher variable and transactions costs through out-sourcing
are less than the savings on fixed costs. In addition, the out-sourcing firm may
find it economic to out-source even when this condition is not met because of
the sharing of risks and the greater flexibility it secures through minimising
its infrastructure and fixed costs. In general, firms with low fixed costs are
more flexible than those with high fixed costs even if the variable costs are
higher.
In a competitive market all firms are under pressure to gain cost advantages
wherever they can be secured. In some cases banks may have gone as far as
they can in cutting costs without a more fundamental re-engineering of the
business such as is implied in contract banking. If technology has the effect
of increasing the economies of scale, the issue becomes how financial firms
can reap such economies. As noted, economies can be secured either
internally or externally but in some cases it may require a fundamental re-
engineering of the bank.
Bringing together the various strands of the argument so far, it would appear
that, with respect to the optimum size of financial firms, conflicting pressures
are operating: (1) technology is increasing the economies of scale and hence
prima facie a need to be large to gain competitive advantage in the market;
(2) the same technology is making deconstruction of processes more feasible
and also widening the range of options for securing economies of scale.
20 Contract banking4. Future for small financial firms
At the outset a central strategic questions was posed: whether there is a viable
business future for the small, regional financial firm. This section addresses
this issue by drawing on the earlier analysis of the paper. There is
a conventional wisdom with some, though a diminishing number of analysts,
suggesting that only large, diversified financial services firms will be able to
compete effectively in the retail financial services markets of the future. This
position has been challenged at various points in this chapter.
The central conclusion is that there is a viable future for small, regional firms
providing they are efficient and, if necessary, are prepared to change
organisational structures to secure the economies of scale externally that they
are unable to generate internally. The rationale of this conclusion may be
summarised by bringing together the various strands of analysis outlined
earlier:
(1) There is considerable doubt about the assertion that internal economies
of scale are important in the financial services firm.
(2) The development of out-sourcing means that there is a viable role for the
small, focused financial firm in a market and technology environment
where many banking operations require large scale to be economic.
While there will be a trend towards more consolidation in the financial
services industry, there will still be a place for the smaller firm though it
may not have the traditional structure. An implication of much of the
analysis of this paper is that financial services firms will be under
constant pressure to cut and contain costs as a permanent feature of
strategy. However, if economies of scale relate predominantly to
processes rather than institutions, the existence of economies of scale
does not mean that only large firms can be competitive and survive.
(3) Consumer unbundling of financial services and products enables
financial institutions to compete against conglomerate firms providing
they are efficient at the limited range of services they offer in the market.
(4) Internet access channels offer advantages to the small firm as they reduce
the need for a substantial infrastructure and branch network. The Internet
lowers the cost of entry, enables efficient small firms to compete, and
21lowers search costs for consumers. In the context of the US, it has been
argued that ‘in some ways the Internet may level the playing field
between large and small banks’, (DeYoung and Hunter, 2001).
(5) Securitisation also enables small firms to compete if they have an
origination advantage but constrained capacity to hold assets on the
balance sheet.
While some financial services firms will undoubtedly seek to merge and
become bigger and more diversified, the fact remains that size per se seldom
gives enduring competitive advantage. This is clearly not an argument that
large size is a disadvantage. The central conclusion is the market place will
sustain a wide variety of different types of financial firm, and that competitive
advantage is determined by internal efficiency rather than taking a particular
position on the Size-Diversification Matrix outlined earlier.
22 Future for small financial firms5. New organisational structures
There is a viable role for comparatively small and focused financial firms.
Many of the traditional arguments about the vulnerability of small and
medium-sized financial institutions assume a continuation of the traditional
structure of the financial firm. This is an unwarranted assumption. Put another
way, the alleged vulnerability of small financial firms is grounded in the ‘old
economics’ of banking.
However, and partly in order to secure economies of scale, success for
comparatively small financial firms may require major changes in
organisational structure at two levels:
(1) a radical deconstruction of processes with firms focusing upon their core
competencies and sub-contracting many processes which have
traditionally been undertaken ‘in-house’, and
(2) by forming Confederations of small financial firms to undertake
processing collectively for their members while each member retains its
competitive independence.
There is a lot to learn in this regard from the experience of countries in
Scandinavia, Continental Europe and also Australia. The idea of co-operative
solutions is common in these countries most especially within the mutual and
co-operative sectors of the financial system. In many European countries and
also in Australia, collective arrangements are common. In many ways Credit
Agricole (once the largest bank in the world) has operated as a confederation
of localised mutual banks though it has recently become more integrated and
is in the process of (at least partly) changing its corporate structure.
Perhaps the best example of a Confederation is Rabobank in the Netherlands.
Although it is often treated as a single entity, it is in truth in part
a Confederation of 350 local Rabobanks each of which has a certain degree
of local autonomy. Rather like OKO Bank in Finland, Rabobank has a dual
structure: Rabobank Nederland serves clients that are too big to deal with
a local Rabobank, and it is an umbrella organisation owned by local banks. As
put recently by a senior executive of the bank:
23‘... it delivers a number of central services, for example in the field of
ICT-systems, a group treasury, product development and research ... Rabobank
Nederland also acts as supervisor of the local Rabobanks on behalf of the
Dutch central bank. Finally, it is the holding company of a number of
subsidiaries. The most important are the insurance company Interpolis, the
leasing company De Lage Landen (which offers alternative sources of finance
for SMEs), Gilde (which offers venture capital) and ... the largest asset
management company in the Netherlands, Robeco, which is fully owned by
Rabobank Nederland’, (Boonstra, 2002).
In Finland, and following the banking crisis of the early 1990s, the many
small Co-operative Banks were reorganised and formed into a Confederation
under the title of OKO Bank Group. OKO is both a bank in its own right but
also serves as the supplier of a wide range of services to local Co-operative
Banks which retain a high degree of autonomy. OKO Bank Group is
a Co-operative Bank in competition with banks and Savings Banks in
Finland. The Group has 244 local Co-operative Banks as members plus OKO
Bank itself. The central body (OKO Bank Group Central Co-operative)
undertakes strategic planning, marketing, supervision, and other support
activities, and is also the owner of OKO Bank which is a listed bank and the
central bank of the group. It also owns a number of subsidiaries.
Other examples of analogous Confederations, though without the cross-
guarantee system of Rabobank, are Federcasse in Italy (which is owned by,
and supplies services to, Co-operative banks in Italy) and the Credit Unions
Services Corporation in Australia.
In the context of rising economies of scale, all of these are designed to enable
small financial institutions to gain the competitive imperative of economies
of scale while at the same time maintaining their competitive independence.
24 New organisational structures6. Economies of scale again
These developments bring into question the traditional measures and concepts
of economies of scale in banking. If there are alternative ways of securing
economies of scale in processes by changing the organisational structure of the
bank (e.g. by outsourcing), the same economies of scale can be secured by
banks of very different size. Under some extreme assumptions (no external
contracting costs, perfect divisibility of processing, etc.) the long run average
cost curve is horizontal and the same for all banks, though different banks will
reach this position through different combinations of internal and external
contracts for processing, etc. This is illustrated in figure 2 where AC1
represents the average cost curve of a bank with old technology with only
internal contracts. AC2 represents the cost curve with new technology with
only internal contracts for processes. This indicates that technology is having
the effect of increasing the economies of scale, raising the optimum scale, and
raising costs at low levels of output compared with old technology. However,
if banks have the option of choosing a mix of internal and external contracts
(in the latter case they effectively buying-in economies of scale from outside
which they cannot secure internally) the average cost curve becomes AC3. In
effect, banks of various sizes can secure the same economies of scale. Thus
empirical testing might show banks of various sizes having the same costs
which might be misinterpreted as there being no economies of scale in banking.
The true interpretation is that economies of scale can be secured by small banks
through greater use of external contracts. However, this will not be identified
with traditional methodologies for measuring economies of scale in banking.
The structure of financial systems is likely to become more diverse as
different firms adopt different combinations of internal and external contracts
for processing. The options are represented in figure 3. At one end of the
spectrum there will be the fully integrated bank which internalises virtually
all of its processes and does everything itself. This is an option only for the
very largest banks. At the other end of the spectrum will lie the Virtual Bank
which externalises almost everything. In practice, the majority of banks will
lie within the box in between the two polar cases.
257. The importance of strategy
This paper has argued against the view, commonly expressed in some banking
circles, that only the very large and highly diversified banks will succeed in
the emerging competitive environment where economies of scale seem to be
growing in importance.
To return to the Strategy Matrix outlined earlier (figure 1), it is unlikely that
strategic success will be achieved simply though positioning on the matrix
because successes and failures are likely to be found throughout the matrix.
Success will be determined more by internal considerations (management
efficiency, etc.) rather than in seeking a particular position in the Strategy
Matrix. 
If positioning on the Strategy Matrix is not the answer, what are likely to be
the key ingredients of strategic success in the new competitive environment
and newly emerging structure of the financial services industry? In many
ways the answer is basic and fundamental:
❍ Above all, it is imperative for financial firms to have a clear and credible
business strategy.
❍ Being realistic about the institution’s core competencies and being
prepared to discard what has hitherto been undertaken internally if there is
no obvious expertise or competitive advantage in it.
❍ Being realistic about the markets in which to operate and to operate in
those markets where the bank has a demonstrable and sustainable
competitive advantage and expertise.
❍ Being good at what the financial firm chooses to do: in many respects,
being good at what a firm chooses to do is more important than precisely
what it chooses to do.
❍ Maximising to the full its information advantages.
❍ Having a permanent cost management strategy as opposed to one-off cost
cutting exercises.
27❍ Being prepared to securitise assets if this is more economic for the
customer than holding them permanently on the balance sheet with funding
and capital backing.
❍ Adopting a radical approach to organisational structure if this proves to be
necessary: this means having a wider variety of internal and external
contracts for the provision of the basic processes that make up the products
and services being offered to customers.
It is sometimes the more basic considerations that are the most important in
a situation where some seek successful strategy in more exotic ways! Above
all, while there is a viable future for comparatively small and regionally-based
banks, it is important for such firms to have a clear and credible business
strategy which focuses upon their strengths and realistic markets.
In the two chapters that follow, two regionally-based Austrian banks outline
their distinctive chosen strategies.
28 The importance of strategy8. Overall assessment
As in many areas, fashion often plays a role in the evolution of bank
strategies: decisions are often made on the basis of very limited evidence and
simple assumptions about what is likely to be successful. There is a danger of
a conventional wisdom emerging: that only large and highly diversified
financial services firms will survive in the strongly competitive environment
that will emerge in the next few years. This could be an illusion.
Technology is having the effect of increasing economies of scale in bank
processes, and competitive pressures will force banks across Europe to find
economies wherever they can. There will be a powerful strategic imperative
to exploit economies of scale. However, our central theme is that there are
many different ways of exploiting economies of scale (both internal and
external) and being a large bank is only one way. This has immediate strategic
relevance for regionally-based banks and other financial institutions.
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351. Klondike in Europe?
Five years ago, any bank pursuing a strategy of building a retail banking
franchise in Central Europe was regarded by other bankers with a mixture of
scepticism and scorn. However, times have changed radically: nowadays, it is
almost a requirement of good retail banking strategy to have a foothold in the
Central and Eastern European countries, or to be on the verge of acquiring
such a foothold.
The ignorance still prevailing only a few years ago with regard to the
economic, political and cultural situation in the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia has given way to what almost amounts to
“gold rush” euphoria, reminiscent of the Klondike region of Canada at the end
of the 19
th century. This applies not only to the banking sector, but also to the
automobile industry (for example Skoda or Audi), the beverage industry
(Pernod Ricard and South African Breweries) and the telecommunications
sector.
Central Europe has turned into a magnet for booming sectors of the economy:
this trend can be seen by studying exports and/or direct investments. Such
exports/investments, coming from enterprises operating out of the EU
countries and directed into the Central European states, have increased
dramatically during the past few years.
Development of Austrian direct investments in the years 1990-1999 
(in millions of EUR)
Source: Oesterreichische Nationalbank (Austrian National Bank).
37The burgeoning interest in Central Europe is not really surprising, considering
that, at present, these countries constitute the only real growth market in
Europe, and it lies right at the front door of the European Union.
The growth potential inherent in these countries can be deduced from
a comparison with the situation in Spain, Portugal or Greece before and a few
years after their accession to the Union. Not only the gross national product,
but also other measures of growth and prosperity, notably investment activity
in those countries as well as exports, have markedly increased or improved.
With regard to the most important economic indicators, such as the rate of
inflation or the interest rate, a convergence leading to stability within the
region was noticeable even before accession.
Central Europe is a sizeable market – even before taking account of Poland,
it has approximately 40 million inhabitants. However, it is not the proverbial
land of milk and honey. Some areas of the law are in need of reform, the
infrastructure only partly satisfies Western standards and the willingness to
give service in the tertiary sector has not kept pace with recent development
and is still more or less at the level maintained throughout Communist times.
Nonetheless, if one observes how quickly and professionally privatisations
are often carried out and how quickly progress in restructuring and
technological change is realized, it appears safe to assume that the
implementation of the necessary reforms over the next few years will not
present any serious problems.
38 Klondike in Europe?2. Enlargement of the EU
From the point of view of Erste Bank, an enlargement of the European Union
is more than a contribution to the political stability of the region. It would
have far-reaching economic consequences – most of them advantageous.
However, the development of a successful regional bank is not seriously
hindered by political frontiers. It is obvious that synergies cannot be exploited
as fully across political frontiers as they can be within a unified economic
area, but this does not mean that political decisions are an obstacle to
expansion.
393. No Pan-European retail bank so far
Retail banking, as we understand it, means a close relationship with
customers in two respects: first, geographically, to be present locally near the
customer by means of a network of branch offices and alternative distribution
channels, and, secondly, to establish local decision-making systems which
guarantee quick, customer oriented solutions, regarding loans for example.
No one knows the structures and requirements of the local industries and
retail customer segments better than the employees in branch offices. There is
no doubt that adequate control mechanisms are necessary, but decisions
regarding loans that are taken in financial centres far away only lead to an
alienation from the customer and his needs. If this is regarded as
a prerequisite for the successful implementation of a retail strategy, there will
be no development leading to a retail bank active throughout all European
countries. On the contrary: geographic proximity to the customer requires an
easy-to-survey radius of activity, as well as a sufficient number of potential
customers.
A study of the development of banking throughout the European countries
over the past ten years confirms the above thesis. Several geographical
regions have produced profitable retail banking over the past few years:
Scandinavia, the British Isles and Ireland. The Iberian peninsula or Germany,
taken by themselves, have evolved into large markets, as has France.
Central Europe, with 40 million plus inhabitants, depending on the
geographical definition, clearly offers a large number of potential customers
by any European standards. We believe this region has the potential to
develop into a highly attractive market for retail banking activities.
Erste Bank’s extended home market in Central Europe represents a key new
European retail banking region:
41Erste Bank’s extended home market in Central Europe – one of the key 
European retail banking regions
The expansion of a bank into Central Europe, a politically stable and
economically booming region, leads, on the one hand, to a more favourable
distribution of risk in markets showing different rates of economic
development and, on the other hand, contributes to a heightened stability of
the bank’s economic development. While economies in Western Europe
stagnate, and politicians are embroiled in futile discussions about the exact
duration of the recession, economic research specialists are predicting growth
rates of more than three percent for key Central European markets, including
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary and Croatia. Admittedly,
such expectations may be exaggerated, and I consider it likely that these
predictions will be modified in the coming months. Nonetheless, the growth
story is clear.
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Selected economic data:
GDP % growth C/A (% of GDP) CPI %
2001e 2002e 2001e 2002e 2001e 2002e
Czech Republic  3.0 3.5 (5.7) (4.8) 4.4 4.0
Slovak Republic  3.2 4.0 (8.9) (6.9) 7.2 4.4
Hungary  4.5 4.8 (3.5) (3.2) 7.8 5.5
Croatia  4.0 3.5 (3.5) (3.0) 4.8 4.5
Austria  1.3 1.9 (2.6) (2.5) 2.6 1.9
Source: Erste Bank Macroeconomic Research Dept.4. Erste Bank’s strategic focus
The strategy of Erste Bank concentrates on business with mass market but
good quality retail customers as well as small and medium-sized enterprises.
From a geographical point of view, we limit ourselves to the region of Austria
and the surrounding countries. These are the Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Croatia and Slovenia. These countries not only present us with
a well-defined economic area with more than 40 million inhabitants, but are
also a geographical entity of a size perfectly adapted to the structure of Erste
Bank.
435. Customers as the basis for economic success
Western European customers are not, of course, comparable in every respect
to those in Central Europe. However, enlargement will render companies
active in this market highly interesting to investors looking for equities with
a high earnings potential.
In the Central European region, the acquisition of the customers is more
cost-effective than in Western Europe. Erste Bank paid approximately
EUR 400 per customer, as compared to a price of EUR 4000 per customer
commonly seen in Western Europe.
It is our opinion that, in this context, the key to success is the number of
customers serviced by a financial institution. The larger the number of
customers to which an institution has access, the stronger its position within
the distribution of financial services.
The more customers an institution can boast, the more attractive it will be as
a partner for other suppliers of financial services, who may not want to build
up their own distribution network or for whom such an investment appears
too expensive. An institution with a market share of between 15 and 20% will
be a welcome partner for insurance companies and investment companies
looking for access to this market. And, as in the grocery trade, any distributor
with a sufficient number of customers will have the bargaining power to
strongly influence the margins at which it sells third party products.
With the acquisition of the two savings banks in the Czech Republic and in
Slovakia, Česká spořitelna and Slovenská sporiteľňa, Erste Bank now has
more than ten million customers, the most comprehensive customer base in
the region at present. Importantly, this has also given Erste Bank the largest
share of deposits in the region. This also brings an advantage that is even
more important for a retail bank, namely, access to inexpensive customer
funds that will ultimately lead to a favourable refinancing basis on the asset
side.
45The Market Strength of Erste Bank in Central Europe 
1
1 including Poland
Source: Bankscope and Goldman Sachs Research
Nowadays, retail banking in Central Europe is less a matter of spreading basic
banking services than it would have been only a few years ago. At that time,
the focus was still on the low percentage of the population owning a bank
account or on the number of enterprises that still handed out their employees’
wages in envelopes. In terms of bank account penetration, the Central
European countries have caught up with amazing rapidity over the last few
years, coming close to Western European standards almost everywhere.
Anew world is opening up in Central European retail banking: nowadays, we
are more concerned with the cross-selling of banking products.
46 Customers as the basis for economic success
Range of products and distribution channels of Erste Bank
Branch offices Financial advisor Callcentre Internet
Austria (A) 1.135
1 √√√
Czech Republic (CZ) 684 √√√
Slovak Republic (SK) 441 --√
Hungary (H) 66 - √ -
Croatia (HR) 107 - √√
Note:
1 Including the 863 branch offices of the Sparkassen (savings banks) groupComparing the market penetration rates for certain key product areas in
Central Europe and Austria gives an indication of the enormous growth
potential. Drawing on data from the two leading retail banks in the Czech
Republic and Slovakia, we find that the ratio of disposable incomes is
approximately one to ten (Czech or Slovak relative to Austrian). However,
one finds that Czechs still invest much less than their Austrian peers. While
each Austrian citizen invests approximately EUR 12,000 of his available
income into funds, the corresponding value in the Czech Republic, where
Erste Bank subsidiary Česká spořitelna has a market share of almost 50% in
the funds area, customers invest no more than approximately EUR 200. The
upside potential for Erste Bank in the Czech market is clear, and the situation
in Slovakia reveals a similar story.
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Growth in financial assets per household
1
NOTE:
1 Erste Bank market share
Based on 2000 Financials and market statistics6. The right moment
In accessing an emerging market, the question of timing is, of course, always
fundamental. In Central Europe, it seems the most important markets – that
are, from our point of view, the countries with the largest populations – have
already been captured and divided up among the various competitors.
A shifting of market shares is only expected in Hungary and Croatia. The
privatisation of the large banking firms has been completed in all countries.
As in Western Europe, the three largest market participants in Poland, the
Czech Republic and Slovakia, together with their subsidiaries, account for
more than 50% of the market. In Hungary and Croatia, a further consolidation
step is expected in the next few years that will offer new opportunities to
acquire market share. Here, some foreign investors are withdrawing because
they are realising that market shares of less than 10% do not constitute
investments with long-term profit potential. This means that regional banks of
varying financial soundness will be for sale.
In our opinion, retail banking can only be carried on successfully in those
economies that have reached a certain level of economic development in
terms of average income or per-capita assets. In other economies, investments
are too risky or the chances of profit are insignificant, owing to a lack of
purchasing power.
Erste Bank succeeded in positioning itself early as one of the leading retail
banks within the region. This is true not only with regard to the market shares
in important product segments, but also with regard to access to the customer
groups that are important for retail banking. We are not late comers, but rather
frontrunners in retail banking in the region. We are among the few banks that
have succeeded in building up a customer base wide enough to enable us to
recoup our investments in the various distribution channels.
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50 The right moment7.  Uniform market for customers and employees
An integral component of Erste Bank’s expansion into Central Europe is the
creation of a uniform geographic market for both customers and employees.
This strongly distinguishes our strategy from that of our competitors.
Our focus on a tightly well defined geographic region is expected to pay
dividends. For example, Vienna is only about 50 minutes drive by car from
the Slovakian capital, Bratislava, with Prague and Budapest less than 4 hours
away. Austria is a popular holiday region for Hungarians and Czechs (and not
just during the ski season!), and the Croatian coast is also high on the list of
favourite holiday destinations of the Central Europeans. The situation is
considerably more challenging for financial institutions whose markets are
divided by greater distances.
We see key strategic advantages coming from a uniform IT-system, for
example enabling the travelling customer to print bank statements in the
required language in all branch offices across the region, or to carry out
banking transactions in all the branch offices.
In particular, we believe our employees profit from the attractions of
a uniform market. Leaving aside for the moment any potential language or
skills barriers, it should be no problem to move from one subsidiary of the
group to another. An employee of our Slovak investment company will be
able to move to an office in Austria or in the Czech Republic, just as a cultural
enthusiast working in our Hungarian operation might be able to carry out his
job as a customer advisor in festival towns like Salzburg, Vienna, Bregenz or
Prague for a few years. These are not utopian ideals: We are well on our way
to making this a way of doing business in the Erste Bank Group!
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551. The development of the banking industry in CEE
It is obvious that with the dramatic political changes beginning in 1989 also
the individual economies of the countries in transformation changed
drastically. As was the case with the real sector, the finance sector, and the
banking industry as the major part of it in these countries, had different ways
of adaptation to choose from.
During the central-planning system, the banking sector was doing little more
than allocating funds to the various sectors and companies according to the
authorities’ decisions. Consequently, at the time the transformation process
began, the banking sector was characterized by parameters such as:
❍ Competition practically zero;
❍ Lack of customer orientation;
❍ Low degree of management know-how and insufficient technical
equipment;
❍ and last, but by no means least: a very poorly developed loan-culture and
risk-awareness.
These features describe not only the desperate state the banking industry was
in at that time, they also were perfect reasons for RZB to start working there
and build up banks to do things better.
The first step in all transition countries was breaking up the monopolistic,
single-tier banking systems. Central banks were established and state-owned
commercial banks were split off, on a functional and partly also on a regional
basis. Sectored restrictions on specialized banks were lifted and private banks
admitted. Banks were allowed to conduct business freely, interest rates
liberalised and foreign banks were granted access to the local markets – in
short, the environment for “normal” banking business was designed.
The second step was the consolidation and actual bank privatisation, and
there, the approaches differed substantially. Countries having started to
privatise early were far more successful than the latecomers (e.g. Hungary vs.
Slovakia). Also, the selling of substantial stakes to foreign investors has
proved to be better for the banks and the economy than privatising broadly via
57coupons. Furthermore, a very important precondition for a successful
privatisation process was the implementation of a modern legal framework.
It is self-explanatory that banks expanding their business from their home-
countries to foreign ones do this with one paramount reason: to earn money, to
see agood return on their investment. The signposts on the road to that ultimate
goal are labelled “higher margins”, “less predatory competition” and “larger
markets”, to name just a few of them. But entering a foreign market is also
beneficial for this market’s financial community and its economy as a whole,
irrespective how this is achieved, by acquisition or “green-field”-projects:
❍ Only foreign ownership puts a break on strong political pressure.
❍ Only foreign ownership introduces a new way of banking and
consequently competition as the driving force for restructuring and
productivity increase. Competition promotes efficiency by ensuring that
prices are set at competitive levels.
❍ Foreign ownership provides access to capital and international distribution
channels and to state-of-the-art technology. Raiffeisen Bank Hungary, e.g.,
has introduced the country’s first electronic banking products in CEE as
early as 1991. Tatra banka, RZB’s subsidiary in Slovakia, was among the
first banks in CEE to offer Internet-banking as early as 1997 and has kept
this leading edge position by constantly bringing new products online.
❍ Foreign ownership brings the required know-how and best practice,
especially in management and risk management.
❍ Foreign ownership introduces product marketing, new sales channels and
a dynamic extension of the product portfolio.
❍ Foreign ownership has sizeable macroeconomic effects in medicating
current account deficit problems and in stimulating further inflow of
foreign direct investments (FDI). Experience shows that the earlier current
account deficit problems surfaced, the sooner the countries opted for
revenue-generating models of privatisation and FDI-friendly policies.
In a nutshell, the presence of international banks is clearly for the hosting
country’s benefit. International banks serve as gateway to foreign investors,
introduce new products, increase competition and bring in know-how and
capital. The other banks have to adjust and improve their services and
performance accordingly. Not only customers benefit from it, the finance
sector as a whole gains. And only a sound finance industry can secure
a sustainable economic development.
58 The development of the banking industry in CEE2. The strategy of RZB in CEE
To understand RZB reasons for “going east” better, we have to look at the
situation at the beginning of the transition process.
❍ Austria has traditionally maintained close trade links with Central and
Eastern Europe – also during the Communist era (around ten per cent of its
trade volume). For more than 30 years, one of RZB’s key activities was to
assist Austrian exporting companies on these markets.
❍ As outlined above, the region was under-banked and under-serviced – and
the finance industry was characterized by low customer orientation.
❍ At the same time, an over-banked market, where shakeouts and market
realignments hardly happened due to the large share of government-owned
banks, characterized Austria’s banking industry.
Then, practically from one day to the other, things changed in 1989 with the
fall of the Iron Curtain.
RZB considered this as a unique chance to change its profile by its own
strength, to develop from an Austrian niche-player to a well-recognized
CEE-specialist within a short period of time. Also, RZB saw the chance to
participate in the growth of the newly emerging markets by creating its own
network of banks. They in turn branched out in their respective local markets
to have access to new market and customer segments.
The most important pillars of RZB’s strategy are the following:
❍ Wherever Raiffeisen goes, it stays for good. For RZB, CEE is a long-term
commitment. RZB has never withdrawn, not even in times of crises, just
the opposite: In the wake of the Russian financial crisis in 1998, RZB was
the first bank to recapitalize its subsidiary in Moscow, underpinning its
firm commitment to the country and the whole region.
❍ RZB has always preferred start-ups to acquisitions. In doing so, RZB has
risk control from the very first moment and avoids the often tedious and
expensive process of acquiring an existing local bank from the state and/or
numerous other shareholders and then having to shape and reshape it
according to its own high standards. 
59❍ When acquiring existing banks – which happened for the first time in 2000
with Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Market banka – RZB follows clear
entrepreneurial principles. Market banka (Raiffeisen Bank d.d. Bosna
i Hercegovina as of fall 2000) was already rated the best bank of the
country even before its integration into the RZB Group and provided an
easy entry into this market, which in turn was and is a valuable part of
RZB’s network in CEE. In 2001, Hrvatska Postanska Banka in the
Herzegovina and Banca Agricola in Romania were bought, both
complementing the countries’ respective Raiffeisen Banks ideally, above
all regarding the retail business. In 2002, RZB purchased more than 97 per
cent of Krekova Banka in Slovenia. This was the first time when RZB
acquired a banking operation in a country where it was not running a bank
yet. Even though this acquisition was of significant importance for
RZB’s activities in Slovenia it went completely in line with one of its major
principles: to offer only prices which reflect the real economic value of
a bank. Apart from attractive pricing the previous private shareholders of
the bank (which in the meantime was renamed Raiffeisen Krekova Banka)
were convinced that RZB is an ideal new owner because both banks share
similar corporate values and a similar historic background.
❍ At the same time, RZB trusts in local experience. Local managers
predominantly run all of its banks. It is obvious that they know the market
best, their experience increased by assignments with international banks
abroad and locally.
❍ RZB usually started with corporate banking and has then gradually
completed its product range to offer universal financial services throughout
the region today, ranging from corporate to private banking, from
investment banking to leasing, from M&A to private equity management.
❍ RZB adds more to the benefits of international banks outlined earlier: It not
only invests substantially to start its operations, RZB’s subsidiary banks
also regularly reinvest the profits in the country where they originate.
Thereby the basis for further organic expansion and more local jobs is laid.
❍ With this philosophy, RZB’s network in CEE has grown dynamically under
its own steam – and keeps growing. It currently covers eleven countries,
offering more than 11,000 jobs throughout its banking network of currently
some 550 outlets.
60 The strategy of RZB in CEEThe result of the efforts during the past 15 years, RZB’s current status, is more
than satisfying: RZB is the leading international bank according to all
relevant parameters, discounting sheer size.
❍ Earning power: RZB showed in Central and Eastern Europe a Return on
Equity ratio in the two-digits range, exceeding several times the 20 per cent
landmark, during the last decade (with the exception of 1998, the year of
the Russian financial crisis).
❍ Quality: RZB Group received for its engagement in Central and Eastern
Europe more than 70 international awards. For example RZB Group was
awarded in September 2001 the title “Bank of the Year in Central and
Eastern Europe” by the magazine The Banker and in spring 2002, Global
Finance chose it for the second consecutive time as “Best Bank in Central
and Eastern Europe and Central Asia”.
❍ Implementation of new technologies: As outlined before (electronic
banking, internet banking) RZB Group is a pioneer regarding the
introduction of new technologies. It claims this innovative power for the
group and constantly works on new customer-oriented solutions.
❍ Structure: RZB’s core is an organically grown network, not purchased and
merged like its competitors’groups.
The outlook for RZB’sbusiness is promising. The enlargement of the European
Union is not a matter of “if” anymore, just one of “when”, and it will bring
numerous opportunities along, for the respective countries’ economies as
a whole, for the financial sectors in particular and for RZB especially.
The strategy of RZB in CEE 613. Opportunities of the EU-enlargement
RZB is absolutely in favour of the enlargement process, having anticipated it
with the consequent expansion of its network banks. The following theses,
with a special emphasis on the banking sector, will support this positive
attitude.
1. Austria has profited over-proportionally both from the opening of the
CEE-markets and from the start of the accession-process.
According to the Austrian Institute of Economic Research (WIFO),
Austria’s GDP has grown by 3.6 per cent due to the opening of the
CEE-markets alone between 1989 and 1997, with 57,000 new jobs having
been created. Austrian exports to CEE have more than tripled within the
decade following the fall of the Iron Curtain; to the CEEC-4 (Hungary, Czech
Republic, Slovakia and Poland) we even saw a 4.5-fold increase. Currently,
approximately 16 per cent of all exports go east, with an upward trend.
Exports have grown faster than imports, resulting in a positive trade balance
that helps compensating the deficit with other countries. Quite contrary to the
often-stated argument that CEE-made products will replace Austrian goods,
growing exports to these countries had and still have a stimulating result on
our economy.
2. The EU-enlargement process not only already led to a significantly faster
change-process in the respective CEE-countries and to an economic
upswing in neighbouring EU-countries like Austria and Germany. In all, it
will be beneficial for the EU-15 countries, too.
The economic advantages will be much higher than the costs (estimated at 60
billion Euro for the first four years after the accession of the first five new
members, i.e. 0.18 per cent of the GDP of the EU-15). This of course applies
especially for the neighbouring countries. Due to Austria’s historical ties to
the region, it will profit over-proportionally from the enlargement. High
investment needs and growing income will even increase these markets’
attractiveness to many sectors of our industry. On the other hand, other
EU-countries, the “net-receivers”, face reduced payments out of structural
and agricultural funds.
633. The candidates’ economies will grow over-proportionally compared with
Western Europe in the next 10 to 15 years.
The results of a study of accession scenarios (Janos Gács, 1999) indicate
a strong pick up of domestic demand, based on a boom in FDIs and inflows
from structural funds. Domestic demand and FDIs are expected to be the
driving forces for GDP growth in CEE.
From the perspective of a bank, not only the GDP-growth rates in general are
encouraging, but specifically the potential of the financial markets, as
compared with the situation we face in Austria and the EU, respectively.
Indices like “banks’ assets to GDP”, “loans to GDP” and “deposits to GDP”
show this potential clearly. The development of financial markets within the
candidate countries as a result of enlargement dynamics will be an enormous
asset for European business. Capital markets under EU regulations will
expand and are expected to attract even more foreign capital, thereby
increasing the potential for banks even more.
4. The process of catching up will lead to a sustained growth in demand for
banking products, not only in the corporate field, but also increasingly in
retail banking.
The countries of CEE have an enormous need to pull through – or better, to
start – restructuring and infrastructure projects, with the dire need to be
financed. Apart from this segment, retail banking is widely underdeveloped
and will become much more interesting in the coming years, with personal
income rising. Relative to Western Europe, retail lending is still in its infancy,
showing ample room for growth in CEE.
Retail lending per capita throughout CEE varies between 0 and 330 USD,
compared with Austria’s 6,850 USD. Medium and long-term projections
expect growth rates of up to 15 per cent p.a. Retail deposits per capita in CEE
vary between 100 and 3,000 USD, in Austria the corresponding figure is
16,000 USD. Growth rates of about 10 per cent p.a. are expected in the long
term for this business sector.
RZB’s strategy regarding retail banking is to target primarily high-income
individuals, a market of currently seven to eight million persons in the region,
forecast to double within the next five to ten years due to the improvement of
economic circumstances. This includes self-employed persons like solicitors
64 Opportunities of the EU-enlargementand doctors. RZB decided to approach a broader customer base on a country-
by-country basis, depending on the local environment.
5. Western banks in CEE will show an over-proportional growth.
This growth will not be driven by excessive competition (predatory
competition and/or creation of needs), but rather by unsaturated natural
demand combined with a vivid market-growth, as opposed to Western
Europe. Austrian banks will have a leading market position, due to their
largely early market-entries. In particular, this will apply to RZB. With its
strong position all over the region, a network of some 550 outlets with
a presence in locations no other Austrian or international bank is active, RZB
always was and still is perfectly prepared for this development.
6. Networking will become increasingly important.
Globalisation, increasing foreign direct investments in CEE, freedom of
establishment all over a growing EU, all this will increase the attraction of the
“Network-approach”. Corporate customers prefer banks that are active
wherever they do their business, wherever they have their own locations and
wherever their customers are. In the EU, the enlargement-candidates and in the
rest of CEE – although in the long run, they all will be candidates. This further
substantiates the last thesis, RZB’s perfect positioning for the customers of
tomorrow. RZB has noticed this trend already some years ago and has built the
necessary infrastructure, above all regarding technology and human resources.
7. Technological infrastructure will become an ever growing success factor
Typically for the development of Emerging Markets, the markets of CEE
have already in the past ten years skipped outdated technologies and instead
concentrated intensively on the utilization of new ones. For instance, there
was practically no business involving bills of exchange and cheques, instead
electronic and Internet banking were developed rapidly. It can be expected
that this trend will continue and also lead to different behaviour of private
individuals and corporations doing their business.
Technological leaders as the RZB Group will take advantage of this
development – as shown by Tatra banka for example, offering “b-mail”,
which informs clients about events on their accounts by SMS (or e-mail). This
service generates up to four per cent of the total SMS volume in Slovakia.
About 15 per cent of Tatra banka’s retail clients’ payments are generated by
Opportunities of the EU-enlargement 65Internet banking. This is much more than in Austria. In Austria’s Raiffeisen
Banking Group, the share of retail customers using the net for all kind of
banking purposes (including account enquiries etc.) is roughly ten per cent.
8. The physical distribution of the Euro
The introduction of the Euro is expected to have a positive impact on the
economies of CEE. The Euro is already the reference currency in the
candidate countries, the current exception being Poland, Romania, Lithuania
and Latvia, and they also will orientate their currencies stronger to our
common currency. The Euro will have positive effects as an anchor of
stability for the countries economies and financial markets (reduced inflation
and risk-premium). It will also lead to restructuring and rationalization
measures (comparable with Austria’s hard currency-policy and peg to the
DEM, preventing monetary measures like devaluation, but making necessary
structural measures instead). After accession to the EU it is expected that the
new member-states will quickly join the European Currency System II, which
is a pre-condition for the monetary union and provides for a fixed peg with
a bandwidth of +/– 15 per cent.
66 Opportunities of the EU-enlargement4. Concluding remarks
❍ Enlargement is a win-win situation, economies in East and West will profit
from the enlargement. Not every single country of the current member
states and not every single sector of their individual economies will be
among the “winners”. However, the economic advantages will be widely
spread among them, while the disadvantages will be concentrated on a few
sectors (e.g. agriculture, low-pay industries). The economies in CEE will
continue to grow, both due to “home-made” growth and to effects in
connection with the enlargement and its anticipation.
❍ The accession of all candidate countries will provide an additional
customer base of some 170 million. The advantages of a larger market will
be enhanced by the fact that the economies of the candidate countries are
widely complementary to EU economies. Therefore, the potential to
increase production levels and achieve economies of scale and higher
productivity for European producers will increase with accession.
❍ Enlargement brings reforms to the candidate countries and demands
reforms in the “old” EU. It is the greatest incentive for the political reform
process in the CEE region – as it used to be for Western European
accession countries just a couple of years ago. Structural reforms within the
EU are highly demanded. The further development of the Union and its
institutions and the enhancement of decision-making procedures are
necessary preconditions for the success of the future enlargement.
❍ The process of catching up with unfulfilled demands on the consumer side
and with growing local investments into production capacity will
inevitably lead to an over-proportional increase in banking business.
❍ The finance-industry in CEE is well prepared for the enlargement. This is
clearly due to the presence of Western banks: directly through the
acquisition of privatised banks or the foundation of subsidiary institutions,
indirectly through the higher level of competition for the customer they
have introduced. RZB’s strategy to build up local banking networks
throughout the region, and beat the competition by going in earlier than
anybody else in most of the markets, has been validated by the
developments of the last years.
67❍ From the economic point of view, the enlargement has already happened to
a large extent. Data from the last ten years prove that there are only few
things left, when it comes to completing transition and enlargement, among
them political hurdles and a lack of European vision.
❍ More than a decade after the fall of the Iron Curtain and the Berlin Wall we
should not let our views be obstructed by mental walls. Our vision, our
mission should be: economical enlargement is done, for all our best – let us
do the rest!
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711. Introduction
The last decade has seen a long-lasting boom on stock markets, especially
in the US, which has led to a problematic development for a number of
small regional markets with respect to their function as a source for raising
capital:
The large stock markets experienced a surge in the liquidity volumes of large
institutional investors, especially of US pension funds, which soon led to the
concentration on a few liquid stocks with relatively high levels of
capitalization. In Germany alone, for example, about 85% of the trading
volume is in the 30 DAX stocks. The phenomenon of the passive index
management strategy pursued by large funds with their year-long practice of
asset allocation according to the regional and sector weightings of a few
international index systems (such as the MSCI, Stoxx 50, etc.) augmented the
global concentration on investments in afew hundred, mainly Anglo-American
stocks.
At the same time, the outflow of capital from European regional markets that
had high concentrations of small caps and mid caps accelerated, affecting
precisely markets like the Austrian capital market.
Even after the collapse of the new economy boom (in 2001: Neuer Markt
–60.10%, NASDAQ Europe –64.15%, NASDAQ USA –24.54%) several
hundred massively overvalued stocks stood in stark contrast to thousands of
undervalued stocks.
The significant function of (regional) capital markets for the economy and for
local policy goals, growth and employment is thus at high risk: this is
precisely where the challenges and chances lie for the further development of
efficient regional stock markets such as Wiener Börse and the Austrian capital
market. In the following, I am going to investigate whether or not the growing
trend of consolidation and concentration among international exchanges
invariably leads to the dissolution of regional exchanges, especially national
stock exchange systems and what alternative strategies are feasible, using the
example of Austrian capital market as a model.
Starting out from a general discussion of the major international benchmarks
for capital markets and stock exchanges, and the scenarios of how stock
73exchanges are responding to the current challenges, especially within Europe,
I will focus on the starting situation and development possibilities of Wiener
Börse as a regional and national stock market.
74 Introduction2.  International developments in the stock market
environment
2.1 Benchmarking capital markets
Efficient capital markets form the optimal interface between supply and
demand for capital:
75At the same time, they also make a crucial contribution to wealth creation and
corporate government improvement:
Studies in Germany and the US prove that listed companies with the option
of raising capital externally also make a major contribution to the
development of the labor market:
Wealth Creation as well as Corporate Improvements
... Driven by Developed Capital Markets
  Long term opportunities for investors to diversify risks and
increase returns
  Improvement of corporate governance
  Companies have increased access to risk capital and more
flexible financing choices
  New sources of capital based on increased foreign investments
  Increased entrepreneurial behaviour
76 International developments in the stock market environmentFinancing of takeover deals is increasingly being done through the exchange
of shares – the company with the “stronger” shares often has an advantage
over a company of equal value without an adequate exchange listing:
A breakdown by market infrastructure, exchange systems, investors, issuers
and financial intermediaries shows the main factors in the ranking of
successful European stock markets:
Infrastructure of capital markets
❑ The existence of an independent supervisory body with comprehensive and
far-reaching powers of intervention and control to prevent market abuse
(insider trading, frontrunning, non-disclosure of important company news,
etc.).
❑ The existence of an independent takeover commission with far-reaching
powers of decision in the case of takeovers of listed companies.
❑ EU compliant legislation for all aspects of the legal framework of the
capital market.
The work in this area will be finalized by 2005 – according to the intentions
of the Commission – and will include more or less harmonized rules and
International developments in the stock market environment 77regulations for the admission to listing, listing prospectuses and supervisory
tasks. I hope that these efforts will not create hypertrophic central authorities,
but efficient, optimally harmonized decentralized systems, which will be
especially important for the improvement of the framework for the
development of regional capital markets.
Stock exchange structure
❑ The use of state-of-the art trading und clearing systems with optimized cost
structures embedded in international networks and operating in a closely
knit and coherent value chain.
❑ A market segmentation according to criteria relating to issuer quality
(disclosure practice, free float, reporting practice, etc.) and which is easy to
understand and use.
❑ Attractive range of products on the cash and derivative markets
❑ Transparency for all market participants
❑ The highest possible market capitalization and a higher free float to
achieve:
❍ optimal liquidity
❍ highest possible number of efficient market participants who are
optimally equipped
Investors
❑ Growing significance of investor protection to prevent violations by
intermediaries (dealers) and issuers.
❑ Massive increase in the investment volumes of retail and institutional
clients. It is precisely this trend that runs against the expansion of
investment opportunities and also contributes to the current phenomenon
of the overvaluation of few investment instruments.
❑ Beside higher investor protection standards, market transparency will play
an increasingly important role as a benchmark.
78 International developments in the stock market environmentIssuers
❑ A stronger focus on shareholder value
❑ Ad hoc disclosure of price-sensitive information
❑ Use of corporate governance rules modeled after the Anglo-American
system
❑ More active investor relations
❑ More need for new opportunities to raise capital through capital markets
(cf. Basel II)
Financial intermediaries/trading participants
❑ Liquidity providers and market makers will play an increasingly important
role for maintaining markets with high trading volumes. Trading systems
without market making commitments are at a disadvantage even now.
❑ Direct distribution channels to end customers – especially via efficient
brokerage platforms for retail customers and institutional investors trading
directly.
❑ The higher degree of transparency in markets and the easy comparability
due to the euro will increase the pressure to install an optimized fee
structure.
❑ More competition through trading volumes.
2.2 Capital market trends in the EU
Currently, there are about 30 national – and within states also smaller regional
– stock exchanges in Europe that operate about 14 different trading systems.
Clearing and settlement is carried out through some 20 different national
institutions. Only two of these institutions are focused on international
markets or are investing efforts in supranational activities (Clearstream and
Euroclear).
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traditional exchanges) can be grouped into a few leading exchanges (a center
field group) and many small niche exchanges with low market shares.
The consolidation that had been expected in Europe for a while now and was
believed to result in two central exchanges at most within the next few years
has become much less likely than at the time the first 3 to 4 large alliances
with differing structures were formed (full merger and use of joint platform,
keeping regional independence). Even now, there are signs of group
formations:
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Fragmentation and inefficiency are features of today’s
European stock market landscape
  Over 30 traditional national
exchanges for stock trading
  12 different trading systems 
  20 clearing & settlement  
institutionsAccording to the study cited above by Accenture, 70% of all experts
interviewed expect to see a common path towards consolidation as regards
trading platforms and clearing and settlement institutions.
It is precisely in the area of clearing and settlement that the consolidation
pressure to create a more competitive European approach vis-à-vis the US
markets is much stronger than in the area of trading systems. The large
European stock exchanges that use systems like XETRA and the trading
platforms EURONEXT, VIRT-X and OM group already have strong market
positions. There is an enormous improvement potential in closing the value
chain within the stock markets (from trading to clearing) and within the
context of European integration and consolidation of clearing and settlement
systems.
Stock exchanges will respond to all these challenges by creating sets of
measures of which the main ones are listed below:
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Euronext
  Belgium (BSX)
  France (SBF)
  Netherlands (AEX)
  United Kingdom (LIFFE) – in process
  Luxembourg
  Portugal
Norex – Nordic Exchange Alliance
  Sweden (OM)
  Denmark (CSE)
  Norway (OSE)













Only two stock exchange alliances are operative82 International developments in the stock market environment
Exchange Reactions to Industry Trends I
Binding of Issuers
  Implementation of new segments (e.g. Star Segment)
  Increased service level (IR support)
Binding of Institutional and Retail Investors
  Decline of trading fees
  Special programs and services for investors
  Increased transparency
  Shift to higher level of investor protection through stricter reporting
requirements for issuers
  Introduction of corporate governance rating
  Increased marketing
  Special education programs
Exchange Reactions to Industry Trends II
Outsourcing or Leveraging of IT Development
  IT outsourcing (e.g. Dublin, Vienna, Helsinki)
  Facility management (e.g. DB, OM, SBF)
Product Diversification
  Regional offshore markets (e.g. EAGAK, Newex)
  New products (e.g. energy, ETF,...)
  Value added services (e.g. IT, training, consulting)
Value Chain Integration
  Integrated Value Chain – from Exchange to CSD (e.g. DB, Euronext)
Growing Trend to Alliances – Two Main Forms
  Mergers (e.g. Euronext)
  Loose form of alliance (e.g. Norex)3. Developments on the Austrian capital market
3.1 Starting situation
Bonds, which have always dominated the Austrian capital market, especially
those issued by the public sector and banks, were supplemented by equity
issues only as late as at the end of the 1980s, when a timid revival of stock
issues and stock trading on Wiener Börse took place after a break of actually
70 years. The trading volumes and market capitalization in equities started to
grow on Wiener Börse only as of 1987, especially due to the privatisation of
formerly state-owned companies and a few private IPOs.
8384 Developments on the Austrian capital marketDevelopments on the Austrian capital market 85Corporate bonds also experienced a revival, though only as of 2001. This
trend will become stronger and take a place alongside the predominant loan
financing among businesses due to, among other things, the dramatic changes
in risk margins of banks that will become necessary after Basel II:
86 Developments on the Austrian capital marketOn the whole, the capitalization of the stock market is only 13.1% of GDP
(= EUR 30bn) and below average in a European comparison, a situation
which is unsatisfactory for the future equity capital needs of the Austrian
economy:
Developments on the Austrian capital market 87Astudy commissioned by Wiener Börse, the Federal Ministry of Finance and
the OeNB conducted by Boston Consulting Group states the following
reasons for this situation:
88 Developments on the Austrian capital marketThe dilemma of the Austrian market is clearly illustrated by the current
structure of Austrian investment funds managed by domestic market
participants: less than 2% of the strongly growing volume of money invested
in funds is invested in Austrian stocks:
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2bn, this share in Germany is at least 13% of German investment funds, for
example, which corresponds to at least EUR 90bn. This is 40 times more!
Although successful in steadily raising the interest of private investors (In
1997, the year of the stock exchange reform and the foundation of the new
Wiener Börse AG as a single cash, derivatives and commodities exchange,
only slightly less than 4% of the Austrian population owned shares
1 and by
2001 it went up to 7% !), a lot remains to be done in order to catch up with
the Western European average.
A very positive contribution to the development of an adequate base for
further stock transactions on the Austrian capital market was provided by the
privatization projects (cf. OMV, VOEST, TELEKOM etc.) and the still small
but growing venture capital scene. An attractive, specifically Austrian
instrument for promoting the formation of the equity capital base of young
companies is the equity capital guarantee of the FGG (Finanzierungsgarantie
Ges.), which is considerably involved in preparing Austrian companies for
a going public:
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1 excl. fundsDevelopments on the Austrian capital market 913.2 Six Hypotheses on the positioning of Wiener Börse as a regional
exchange and the Austrian economic region in a single European
market
Hypothesis 1
The establishment of a strong capital market in Austria is vital for maintaining
and expanding the region as a business location and for securing stability in
the labour market. Efficient, tradable instruments of equity and external
capital need to be developed in a joint effort with potential issuers and
regional retail and institutional investors as well as with domestic and foreign
investment banks and trading participants in the Austrian market.
There is no other stock exchange organization that is better qualified than
Wiener Börse, being specialized in the regional economic area of Austria, to
organize a platform for the listing of new issues and trading in equity and debt
capital for the Austrian market. It is also the only stock exchange organization
that has a direct interest in the development of the domestic capital market.
Wiener Börse AG will implement the following projects in the future:
❑ the organization of an inexpensive market model that optimizes liquidity
for trading in the cash and derivative markets
❑ Quality segmentation and surveillance of the market (cf. prime market)
❑ best possible services offered to regional issuers in the area of stocks and
bonds (new growth segment: corporate bonds)
• support for IR strategies
• consulting services in preparations for public offerings
❑ Optimal support for the market environment for private investors
❑ Flexibility in the new design of products
It is precisely the small and medium-sized structure of the Austrian economic
area that calls for this type of specialized strategy. The potential for boosting
the capital market is high and definitely exists:
92 Developments on the Austrian capital marketThe percentage of the population of private individuals owning shares is
currently 7.5% and it should be possible to increase it to 12 – 15% by 2005.
The capitalization of the Austrian stock market is currently EUR 30bn and
only about 13.1% of the GDP. Further privatisations and IPOs by private
companies on Wiener Börse should help to raise the percentages considerably
in the next 5 to 10 years.
Hypothesis 2
By using the international trading platform XETRA on the cash market,
Wiener Börse is actively involved in the alliance of the XETRA Group of
Deutsche Börse Frankfurt. This means that the stock market in Vienna and
with it the Austrian capital market is not a regionally limited one, but rather
globally accessible.
The trading participants (remote members) are linked either via direct lines to
the XETRA system or since October 2001 via the Internet broker system of
Wiener Börse. This makes it possible to take advantage of the benefits of the
technical and economic aspects of an international stock exchange alliance
for a regional market and to create inexpensive structures.
Hypothesis 3
The direct vicinity of regional exchanges to local markets, as in the case of
Wiener Börse AG, and the direct broker platforms of the banks and trading
participants are used for gaining more private investors by taking customized
measures to meet the needs of such regional markets. The additional range of
information and marketing services offered by Wiener Börse AG makes it
extremely competitive over alternative competitors.
Hypothesis 4
Optimally organized and internationally integrated regional exchanges
contribute substantially to improving the quality of decentralized, regional
markets. Not only with respect to the ongoing monitoring of quality and
disclosure standards for listed companies, compliance with trading norms and
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degree of legal certainty achieved by closely collaborating with supervisory
authorities.
Moreover, the activities of a well-functioning, specialized regional exchange
are crucial for maintaining many areas of work for the region in the fields of
banking and finance industry, law and fiduciary service, consulting etc.
Training and education institutions, especially also universities benefit greatly
from these activities. The creation and preservation of jobs in a region that
requires highly qualified staff profits in particular from the activities of the
local exchange.
Hypothesis 5
The technological revolution in trading and settlement systems and the
technical feasibility of inexpensive, virtual “pseudo exchanges” in
conjunction with the one-sided arguments for minimal system costs have
brought to light the main tasks of an exchange, namely:
❑ Optimal framework for local companies wishing to raise capital
❑ Full independence from all involved “customer groups” (market
participants, investors, issuers) especially from the trading interest of the
large global banks
❑ Attainment of the highest possible trading volumes in a single security
instead of the dispersion of possible volumes across several competing
alternative market systems
This should be taken into account all the more considering that a modern
regional exchange such as Wiener Börse AG offers the advantages of efficient
electronic trading and information systems anyway.
Hypothesis 6
Even in an economically unified Europe with one single currency the specific
cultures and languages of the different countries or regions will last. To
motivate and mobilize the regional potential will require a future organization
94 Developments on the Austrian capital marketthat truly represents the unique characteristics of the region. That way an
optimally structured regional exchange will be an integrative partner of
a European platform and a local marketing specialist with an optimal
marketing strategy to meet the local needs of their region.
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Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières
SUERF is incorporated in France as a non-profit-making Association. It was
founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate
and personal membership fees. Corporate membership currently includes
major European financial institutions and Central Banks. SUERF is strongly
supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership comprises most of
Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for International
Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, other financial
institutions and academics.
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